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Introduction
An automobile driver must carefully apportion their attention to multiple tasks,
such as pressing the accelerator, monitoring the speedometer, adjusting the steering
wheel to maintain proper alignment, visually scanning for a highway exit, and
formulating a mental list of needed groceries, just to name a few. Some stimuli may
“grab” the driver’s attention (e.g., the sudden realization that an errand was neglected),
for better or worse. Other stimuli may be less compelling but nevertheless warrant
consideration at times, requiring the driver to volitionally redirect their attention (e.g.,
glance at the fuel tank gage). This driving example illustrates several principles of the
human attention system. First, the content of attention may be an object in our external
environment or internal mental activity (e.g., Gehring, Bryck, Jonides, Albin, & Badre,
2003). Second, our attentional resources are limited (Shapiro, 2001), which necessitates
the frequent switching of attention during complex tasks (Burgess, 2000). Indeed, the
Oxford English Dictionary definition of multitasking, the “ability to perform concurrent
tasks or jobs by interleaving [italics added],” acknowledges this reality. Third, whether
we maintain or switch the focus of our attention is influenced by bottom-up (stimulusdriven) and top-down (volitionally controlled) forces (Monsell, 2003). The interplay
between these forces determines the focus of our attention at any given moment (Yantis,

2000).
Attention switching is seamlessly coordinated, allowing us to (usually) evade
such misfortunes as traffic accidents. This is achieved by executive control, the ability to
volitionally direct attention in mental and physical space. To appreciate the importance
of executive control, consider the consequences of its momentary incapacity, such as
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delaying to disengage from one task and switch to another, or equally problematic,
prematurely disengaging because of a distraction. Such failures occur on occasion in
healthy individuals, especially when they are fatigued (Manly, Lewis, Robertson,
Watson, & Datta, 2002) or when their attention is taxed (Robertson, Manly, Andrade,
Baddeley, & Yiend, 1997), and can be markedly exaggerated by brain disease. Certain
brain-damaged patients tend to, on one hand, get stuck on an idea or activity, unable to
desist. On the other hand, they may be highly distractible such that every noise,
movement, or spontaneous thought captures their attention. Executive control is thought
to be the most fundamental, yet perplexing problem facing cognitive neuroscientists
(Logan, 2003; Monsell, 2003).
Despite its widespread acceptance in the research literature, the term “executive
control” is fraught with ambiguity. It misleadingly suggests equivalence with the term
executive functioning, which refers more generally to all capacities that support
independent purposive behavior (Lezak, Howieson, & Loring, 2004). It also falsely
implies that a unitary entity (i.e., homunculus) exerts the control. As shall become clear,
control emerges from the interaction between complementary cognitive processes
(Gruber & Goschke, 2004), not from a mysterious and unmeasurable “puppet-master.”
Executive control is closely related to the “anterior attention system” (Stuss,
Shallice, Alexander, & Picton, 1995), “supervisory attention system” (Norman &
Shallice, 1986), and volitional attention network (Mesulam, 1999), all of which can be
distinguished from involuntary attentional systems. The most familiar typology of
attention, developed and revised by Posner and colleagues (Berger & Posner, 2000;
Posner & Dehaene, 1994; Posner & Peterson, 1990; Posner & Raichle, 1994),

2

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

differentiates executive control from two other networks responsible for orienting and
alerting/vigilance, respectively. Understanding the concept of executive control in the
context of other higher-order cognitive functions involved in voluntary action is
complicated by a lack of consensus in the field. Executive control is probably necessary
but not sufficient to conceive, plan, and carry out novel goal-directed behavior. It can
therefore be thought of as a component executive function (Lezak et al., 2004).
However, the distinction between executive control and other components, such as
working memory and response inhibition, is unclear (Wecker, Kramer, Hallam, & Delis,
2005). Some theorists believe them to be distinct constructs (Logan, 2004; Miyake et ah,
2000) that work in harmony (Roberts & Pennington, 1996), whereas others remain
unconvinced that they are theoretically separable (Kane, Bleckley, Conway, & Engle,
2001; Kimberg & Farah, 2000).
Much work over the past decade has begun to elucidate the cognitive architecture
of executive control. Early models that posited an omnipotent homunculus that directed
our attention - as exemplified by Baddeley and Hitch’s (1974) “central executive” and
Norman and Shallice’s (1986) “supervisory attentional system” - have become
understood to be placeholders awaiting explanation rather than adequate accounts of
executive control. This led to a drive towards abandoning the concept of a unitary
attention control center or at least fractionating it into definable components (Baddeley,
1996; Monsell & Driver, 2000; Parkin, 1998; Stuss & Alexander, 2000). Hommel,
Daum, and Kluwe (2004) suggest parameters for this vague goal. They argue that an
adequate model of executive control must specify what is controlled and how it is
controlled, and ultimately, who does the controlling. Accounts for these three

3
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components based on an integrated literature review will now be discussed in turn.
“Mental sets” are what is controlled. A mental set is a response disposition or
state of readiness for action. More formally, it is a schema that biases a cognitive
network towards a certain action in response to a given stimulus (Mayr, 2003). These
biases are created by constraints that come from multiple sources. One source of
constraint is long-term memory (i.e., the network’s structure), or stimulus-response
mappings that gradually develop over time with practice. For example, a cup (the
stimulus) is typically grasped with the dominant hand and drawn to one’s lips (the
response). Constraints can also be activation-based. These may be internally (e.g.,
activated goals) or externally (e.g., task instructions) generated. These activation-based
constraints modulate the network’s structure, thereby biasing it to respond a certain way
to a given stimulus.
Explaining how mental sets lead to behavioral responses, Goschke (2003) posits
that response selection occurs as a process of constraint satisfaction. A mental set
prepares the stage so that once the stimulus is presented, the chain of events leading to a
response can then unfold automatically in a “prepared reflex” (Hommel, 2000). William
James (1950, c l 890) elegantly summarized this view more than a century ago, stating
that “the essential achievement of the will, in short, when it is most ‘voluntary,’ is to
attend to a difficult object and hold it fast before the mind. The so-doing is the fiat; and it
is a mere physiological incident that when the object is thus attended to, immediate motor
consequences should ensue” (pg. 561).
Perhaps the most striking evidence for mental sets and their link to overt
behavioral action comes from brain-injured patients who exhibit “utilization behavior”

4
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(Archibald, Mateer, & Kerns, 2001; Lhermitte, 1983), in which actions are elicited by
common objects. For example, a patient may drink from a cup, not to achieve an
intended goal (e.g., quenching thirst), but because the mere presence of those objects
triggers their highly-associated actions.
Multiple (potentially task-relevant) mental sets may be stored in working memory
simultaneously, with only one being activated above a certain threshold (Norman &
Shallice, 1986). Switching mental sets, then, would require reallocation of attention to
another mental set within working memory. This view has been criticized on the grounds
that it would be maladaptive to hold multiple sets of rules in working memory
simultaneously because they would cause crosstalk, or interference, especially in the case
of overlapping stimulus-response mappings (Rubinstein, Meyer, & Evans, 2001). An
alternative view is that only the selected mental set is activated in working memory and
the others are eliminated (Mayr & Kliegl, 2000). In this model, switching requires
actively retrieving a mental set from long-term memory, bringing it into working
memory. This model is considerate of the limited capacity of working memory (Miyake
& Shah, 1999) and is consistent with two recent findings: rapid shifting between tasks is
independent of the number of potentially to-be-switched-to tasks (Logan, 2004) and that
switching to complex tasks takes longer than switching to simple tasks (Yeung &
Monsell, 2003). Thus, the literature favors the theory that only in-use mental sets are
present in working memory (Mayr & Kliegl, 2000).
Although there is reasonable convergence in the literature regarding what is
controlled (mental sets), debate persists over how the disengagement and engagement
processes of a set switch play out. Rubinstein et al. (2001) propose a two-stage model

5
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that includes goal-shifting and rule-activation. Goal-shifting takes place before a
stimulus is presented, and involves bringing goal-relevant information (e.g., that
identifies the switched-to task) into working memory. Rule activation takes place in
between stimulus identification and response selection, and involves engaging
appropriate and disengaging inappropriate rules for selecting a response for the current
task. Kleinsorge, Heuer, & Schmidtke (2002) found support for a model that
distinguishes between set-selection operations and implementation operations. The
former are endogenously controlled and akin to Rubinstein et al.’s (2001) “goal-shifting.”
The latter are of two classes, an endogenously controlled one that involves encoding task
cues and one that is exogenously controlled and similar to Rubinstein’s et al.’s “ruleactivation.” This model is hierarchical, such that the implementation process
automatically follows (or is for the most part a consequence of) the highest-order process,
set-selection. Mayr and Kliegl (2003) propose a similar two-stage model that includes a
retrieval stage, during which a cue triggers the task rules to be retrieved from long-term
memory into working memory, and an application stage, in which the task rules are
automatically applied at stimulus onset. What these models have in common is a
volitional activation/retrieval stage and an automatic application/implementation stage.
Because sustained activation is characteristic of mental sets (Goschke & Kuhl,
1993), passive decay is likely insufficient to rid working memory of a no longer relevant
mental set. Rather, deactivation of the now task-irrelevant set through inhibitory
processes, or backward inhibition, is required (Arbuthnott & Frank, 2000; Mayr & Keele,
2000). This may be especially true for mental sets that have been guiding behavior
successfully for some time, and then, in an instant, are no longer appropriate. A series of

6
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experiments by Mayr and Keele (2000) revealed that subjects were slower to switch back
to a recently abandoned task (compared to a remotely abandoned task), even when a
return to the abandoned task set soon after was fully predictable, and this effect was only
observed when shifts needed to be endogenously triggered. In summary, top-down
contributions to set-switching appear to include activation of the appropriate set and
inhibition of competing sets. This is consistent with Stuss and colleagues’ (1995; 2005)
hypothesized component processes in set-switching.
Another aspect of the how question pertains to set selection. As alluded to earlier,
both endogenous and exogenous forces are involved in this process (Monsell, 2003;
Ruthruff, Remington, & Johnston, 2001). Endogenous, or top-down input may promote
selection of the task-relevant mental set through sustained activation of the current set if
task continuation or repetition is the goal, and inhibition of the current set/retrieval of a
new set when shifting tasks is required. Exogenous, or bottom-up forces involve the
automatic activation of a mental set through overleamed stimulus-response mappings.
Since these exogenous forces operate irrespective of the subject’s goal for good task
performance, they may or may not promote selection of the appropriate mental set. If
they do favor selection of the task-relevant set, endogenous control would be redundant.
If they do not, endogenous input must be sufficient to overcome exogenous forces; using
the terminology of Norman & Shallice’s (1986) influential model, the deployment of
supervisory attention must suppress stimulus-driven activation of schemata. The usual
final outcome of this interaction between endogenous and exogenous forces is, assuming
the subject is cognitively intact, the selection of the task-relevant set - the one that
optimizes performance (Mayr, 2003).

7
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Since endogenous input is probably applied continuously and adjusted on-line to
minimally meet demands (Monsell, Sumner, & Water, 2003; Yeung & Monsell, 2003),
the system must somehow “know” when exogenously-triggered responses are inadequate
and endogenous modulation is needed. So, we are forced to assume the existence of a
cognitive system that monitors the need for executive control functions and then
communicates this information to brain regions that implement them. Such a component
is necessary to account for the findings that healthy subjects modify their response biases
on-line to optimize performance in response to committing errors (e.g., Laming, 1968) or
changing task demands (e.g., Logan & Zbrodoff, 1979). To explain these phenomena,
several researchers have proposed a system that monitors response conflicts, which
trigger the need for increased executive control (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, &
Cohen, 2001; Botnivick, Braver, Yeung, Ullsperger, Carter, & Cohen, 2004; Miller &
Cohen, 2001; Norman & Shallice, 1986). For example, when a prepotent but incorrect
response and a correct response are both activated, as in the Stroop task, or when two (or
more) equally correct responses are activated, as in stem completion tasks, this conflictmonitoring system signals the need for the recruitment of additional conscious attention
resources.
Although this conflict-monitoring system specifies how the level of endogenous
control is regulated in response to changing task demands, it does not explicate what type
of control is exerted or in other words, how conflict is resolved. To fill this void,
Goschke (2000; 2003; see also Gruber & Goschke, 2004) proposed a model that accounts
for the quality (i.e., not just the quantity) of executive control, and thus answers Hommel
et al.’s (2004) who question by defining executive control as emergent property

8
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complementary cognitive networks. In Goschke’s model, an ever-changing environment
demands two central properties of the attention system: persistence and flexibility. The
former enables intense concentration, even in the face of distracters (e.g., reading an
article in a noisy lobby), whereas the latter refers to our ability to interrupt an ongoing
activity to pursue a new one (e.g., dropping the magazine and leaving the building upon
hearing the fire alarm ring) when it becomes advantageous. These properties are
achieved by a context-sensitive balance between two control processes, one that serves
the stable maintenance of a mental set over time and resistance of distraction, and another
that promotes openness to potentially relevant information (i.e., background monitoring)
and a disposition to quickly reconfigure set if the need arises. These processes are
antagonistic, such that ramping up one incurs a cost to the other. Therefore, adaptive
executive control requires a balance between persistence and flexibility, and pathological
executive control is characterized by a dysregulation of this balance. A similar but less
elaborated model put forth by Cohen, Aston-Jones, & Gilzenrat (2004) posits a system
that receives input from the conflict-monitoring system and passes on signals to promote
either “exploitation” (selective attention to task-relevant features) or “exploration”
(permitting the processing of task-irrelevant features), depending on the task demands.
Conceptualization of executive control as a persistence-flexibility dilemma has
been documented previously, such as Mesulam’s (1999) dictum that an “interplay
between concentration and distractibility is one of the most essential prerequisites for
advanced mental activity” (p. 238). Moreover, the paradoxical consequences of impaired
executive control, perseveration and distractibility, have been known for some time. In
fact, in the first detailed case report of a patient who incurred frontal lobe trauma, Harlow
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(1868) describes post-injury Phineas Gage as “pertinaciously obstinate, yet capricious
and vacillating” (pg. 339). Nevertheless, Goschke appears to be the first to propose a
plausible account for how the persistence-flexibility trade-off is dynamically regulated.
As such, his model offers great promise in advancing our understanding of executive
control, and more generally, purposive behavior. Before this model is widely adopted,
however, its assumptions will need to be clearly identified and empirically validated.
The task-switching paradigm has proved successful for evaluating theoretical
models of executive control. It enables cognitive scientists to study executive control
processes with better experimental rigor and has become the tool of choice (Miyake et al.,
2000; Monsell, 2003), espoused over those developed for clinical purposes, such as the
Wisconsin Card Sorting Task (WCST; Grant & Berg, 1948; Nelson, 1976). Such clinical
measures are highly multifactorial and likely recruit executive control to some extent, but
undoubtedly also involve an array of other cognitive abilities (e.g., Ridderinkhof, Span,
& van der Molen, 2002). There are several variations of the task-switching paradigm, but
all require subjects to rapidly switch back and forth between performing two simple tasks
(e.g., classification as odd/even or greater/less than 5) on a set of bivalent stimuli (e.g.,
single digits). Since both tasks can be performed on the same stimuli, presenting a target
stimulus does not uniquely indicate a particular task. The to-be-performed task is
specified on a trial-by-trial basis by providing an explicit cue prior to or concurrently
with the stimulus onset (random-cued paradigm; Meiran, 1996), making the task order
entirely predictable (alternating runs paradigm; Rogers & Monsell, 1995), or allowing
subjects to determine the task order (Arrington & Logan, 2004). Performance is typically
measured by response time (RT) and accuracy. The observed effects of manipulating

10
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various parameters such as stimulus type, intertrial intervals, etc., on repetition (i.e., AA)
and switch (i.e., A B ) trial performance can inform theoretical constructs.
In the context of the task-switching paradigm, the specific assumptions of
Goschke’s model can be laid out. First, the model posits that preparatory processes are
not specific to switch trials. Rather, it predicts that a preparatory state of persistence perhaps involving sustained activation of the current set and inhibition of all taskirrelevant information - can facilitate performance on repetition trials. Second, the model
proposes that switching tasks can be assisted by a general preparatory state of flexibility.
This state may be characterized by sensitivity to information irrelevant to the current task
and a readiness to quickly shift mental set if the need arises. Third, the model presumes
that these preparatory states are antagonistic, such that persistence incurs a cost to
flexibility and vice versa. In other words, experimental conditions that lead to improved
repetition trial performance should also be associated with decrements in switch trial
performance, and vice versa. Fourth, the model presumes that the balance between
persistence and flexibility is regulated in response to changing environmental conditions.
Thus, covert changes to the task context should induce an adjustment to this balance in
order to optimize performance.
Some previously reported research findings have relevance to these assumptions.
Consistent with the first prediction, allowing for preparation by lengthening the
interstimulus interval (up to one second or so) speeds up RT not only on switch trials, but
on repetition trials as well, albeit not to the same degree (Rogers & Monsell, 1995;
Meiran, 1996). This modest benefit of preparation time is likely limited by the difficulty
level of the tasks used in these studies, and would likely be larger if ceiling effects could
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be avoided. To further explore the preparatory process involved in task repetition,
Ruthruff et al. (2001) employed the alternating runs version of the task-switching
paradigm (i.e., AABBAA), but occasionally (on 13.3% of trials) violated the task order to
create unexpected repetition (i.e., AABBBA) and switch (i.e., AABBAB) trials. They
used two sets of univalent stimuli, each with four possible responses mapped on to two
keys. The response-stimulus interval was 1500 - 1700 ms, allowing for adequate
preparation time. Repetition trials were performed faster than switch trials (a repetition
main effect) and expected tasks were performed faster than unexpected tasks (a
probability main effect). Importantly, these two factors did not interact. That is,
foreknowledge of the upcoming task/trial type similarly facilitated repetition and switch
trial performance, indicating that time-consuming preparatory processes are involved in
both trial types. Another study compared conditions with predictable versus random
task-ordering and found that foreknowledge of the upcoming task (possible only in the
predictably ordered block) sped up RT similarly on both repetition and switch trials
(Sohn & Carlson, 1998). All of these findings are in line with the first assumption of
Goschke’s model - that preparatory processes are not specific to switch trials.
With regard to the second assumption, helpful preparation for switch trials is
suggested by the common finding that switch trials are performed faster at longer
interstimulus intervals. In their seminal paper, Rogers and Monsell (1995) showed that
switch costs decrease (i.e., the relative RT advantage for repetition trials over switch
trials diminished) with increasing response-stimulus intervals, and eventually leveled out
at about 600 ms. This benefit from preparation time has been replicated several times in
other paradigms (Arrington & Logan, 2004; Kray & Lindenberger, 2000; Meiran, 1996;
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but see Koch, 2003), and has been interpreted to reflect active preparation for the
upcoming switch trial via time-consuming executive control processes (Rogers & Mosell,
1995) or passive decay of interference from the previous trial (Allport, Styles, & Hsieh,
1994). Because the duration of the preparation period was confounded with remoteness
from the previous trial in both Allport et al.’s (1994) and Rogers and M onsell’s (1995)
studies, the effect of reduced switch costs could not be unequivocally attributed to active
preparation or passive decay. To resolve this, Meiran (1996) used the random-cued
paradigm, in which these factors can be unconfounded. He found that switch costs were
reduced by lengthening the cue-stimulus interval (CSI), thereby unequivocally
demonstrating that active preparation prior to task execution was at least partly
responsible for the RT reduction. Meiran, Chorev, and Sapir (2000) expanded on this
finding by showing that both active reconfiguration and passive decay of the previous
task set contributed to the reduction of switching costs with preparation time. Using the
random-cued paradigm, they first prolonged the response-cue interval (RCI) and
observed a switch cost reduction, consistent with passive decay. They then prolonged the
CSI and observed a further reduction in switch costs, consistent with active preparation.
Rather than vary the amount of time to prepare, Sohn and Carlson (2000;
Experiment 3) manipulated subjects’ knowledge about the forthcoming task. They
compared conditions in which the task type on the forthcoming trial (letter, digit, or
symbol classification) was entirely predictable vs. random. In both conditions, the
upcoming trial type (repetition or switch) was entirely predictable. Note that for
repetition trials, the upcoming task type was necessarily predefined (i.e., AA) in both
conditions. However, for switch trials, it was not predefined in the random condition
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(AB or AC, with equal probability) because the authors used three tasks. Foreknowledge
interacted with switch cost, suggesting that knowing the specific identity of the upcoming
task facilitated preparation over and above knowing only that a switch trial was
forthcoming. In other words, task-specific preparation is more beneficial than generic
preparation for switch. Since this study did not include a condition in which subjects had
no foreknowledge of both the upcoming trial type and task type, it remains to be
determined whether generic preparation for a switch is more beneficial than no
preparation, which is exactly what Goschke’s model predicts.
Getting closer to this issue, Dreisbach, Haider, and Kluwe (2002) cleverly
manipulated subjects’ trial-by-trial expectancies by providing probability cues before
each trial. This cue indicated, with a probability of .25, .50, .75, or 1.00, which task was
to be performed on the forthcoming trial. These authors used two sets of stimuli
(numbers and letters), and each was associated with two different tasks (odd/even,
greater/less than 7; consonant/vowel, before/after M). The stimuli appeared in a color
that specified a particular task. With a RCI of 2,000 ms and a CSI of 1,500 ms,
Dreisbach et al. (2002) found that probability had similar effects on repetition and switch
trial performance (a null interaction) - decreasing RT with increasing probabilities.
Repetitions were performed faster than switches across the range of probabilities. In a
second experiment, they replicated these findings using univalent stimuli (four tasks
associated with four unique stimulus sets). A subsequent experiment used the identical
stimulus set as in the first experiment and probability cues that were either the same as in
their first experiment or were only semispecific - indicating an upcoming task-switch
without specifying which of the three tasks was to be performed. The instruction
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indicating which of these tasks to perform came simultaneously with stimulus
presentation. This experiment replicated the results of the first one, finding that
probability had a similar effect on both repetition and switch trials. However, for the
semispecific cues, the authors found an interaction between trial types - the probability
cues had an effect on repetition trials (as with the specific cues) but not switch trials. In a
final experiment using the same stimuli but a broader range of probability cues (1.0, .75,
.50, .25) and only semispecific cues, the authors similarly found linear decreases in
repetition trial RT with increasing certainty of an upcoming repetition, but no probability
effects for switch trials. Dreisbach et al. (2002) concluded that preparation for a task
switch is not possible without knowledge of the specific to-be-switched-to task.
Note that a lack of preparation for upcoming switch trials without foreknowledge
of the to-be-switched-to task is incompatible with the second assumption of Goschke’s
model. Rather, the model posits a more general state of “readiness to switch to different
tasks” (Goschke, 2G03, p. 70), in which individuals loosen their attentional focus on the
current task and monitor their environment for a set-switch signal. Therefore,
performance on a switch trial should be faster when it is anticipated versus unexpected,
even if the to-be-switched-to task is not revealed in advance. As a real-world example,
imagine you are reading the newspaper on a park bench. With previous knowledge that a
serial killer is at large in the neighborhood, you would probably focus less on the
newspaper and glance at passer-bys with greater scrutiny (i.e., a flexibility for persistence
trade-off). Is knowledge of your action upon observation of a suspicious person (e.g., run
away, alert the authorities on your cellular phone, pretend to keep reading, etc.) a
necessary prerequisite for this state? Introspection suggests not.
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If preparation for a task switch without knowledge of the specific forthcoming
task is indeed possible, one can only speculate about the processes that underlie it. Recall
that the research literature converges on a two-stage model of task-switching that
involves activation/retrieval of the new task and inhibition of the no-longer-appropriate
task. Clearly, the mental set associated with a new task could not be retrieved before its
identity has been revealed (unless subjects luckily guess or have a valid reason to expect
a particular task, e.g., unequal probability). It is conceivable, however, that subjects
might inhibit the mental set associated with the just-performed task in the case of an
expected switch. This would help reduce interference with whichever task is to be
performed on the forthcoming trial. However, there is some evidence to suggest that
backward inhibition occurs only with activation of the new task set (Dreisbach et al.,
2002; Hubner, Dreisbach, Haider, & Kluwe, 2003; Mayr & Keele, 2000), or only with
response-related processes (Shuch & Koch, 2003).
Mayr & Keele (2000, Experiment 3) had subjects switch to one of three tasks on
every trial in an unpredictable order. A switch was thus guaranteed on each trial, but the
identity of to-be-switched-to task was unknown until explicitly cued 700 ms prior to or
simultaneously with presentation of the target stimulus. Backward inhibition - slower
RT when a task was performed recently versus more remotely - was found only in the
pre-cued condition, suggesting that knowledge of trial transition alone was insufficient to
bring about inhibition of just-engaged mental set. Hubner et al. (2003) had participants
switch between three tasks that were associated with three sets of univalent stimuli.
Stimulus presentation was sometimes preceded by task cues (presented 500 ms following
a response) that either specified the forthcoming task or merely that a switch was
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forthcoming. The target stimulus then appeared 1500 ms later flanked by stimuli from
either the preceding task or a control task, or not flanked. Interference from flankers was
reduced by the specific tasks cues, but not by the cues merely indicating a task switch
without specifying the to-be-performed task in advance. Taken together, it appears that
knowledge of the specific forthcoming task is required for backward inhibition.
If not activation/retrieval of the new set or backward inhibition, what processes
could facilitate unspecific preparation for a task switch? Goschke (2000; 2003; Gruber &
Goschke, 2004) states that enhanced sensitivity to potentially relevant novel stimuli may
be achieved by lowering the threshold of accessibility to working memory. In the taskswitching paradigm, enhanced sensitivity may involve a bias to process one attribute of
bivalent stimuli, such as the letter in the stimulus “G4” if the odd/even task was just
performed and a task-switch is expected to be forthcoming. Desimone & Duncan (1995)
provide a mechanism for how this might be achieved, at least in the visual domain: an
“attentional template” biases processing in the visual cortex to selective stimulus
properties or to screen out unwanted stimulus features (e.g., shape, color, location).
Interestingly, in the Dreisbach et al. (2002) study that found no evidence for a general
preparatory state, the experimental design may have disallowed this possibility by using
four tasks that were associated with two stimulus sets, letters and numbers. Therefore,
with foreknowledge of a task switch, selective attention to one aspect of the stimulus
(e.g., numbers) would not be advantageous. As a result, their conclusion that “unspecific
preparation for a task shift does not seem possible” (Dreisbach et al., 2002, p. 480) may
be premature.
Another plausible means for unspecific task-switch preparation may be to keep all
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potential mental sets partially activated (Gruber & Goschke, 2004). A theoretical
foundation for this hypothesis is found in guided activation theory (Cohen et al., 2004;
Miller & Cohen, 2001) and its elaborations (e.g., Gilbert & Shallice, 2002), which
propose that partial activation facilitates responding to a particular stimulus attribute by
lowering the activation threshold for the mental set associated with that attribute. Thus,
potentially relevant mental sets will require less stimulus-driven activation to be loaded
into working memory, and so will be more readily selected over competing mental sets.
This theory, however, has not been extended to account for partial activation of multiple
(competing) sets, a situation that may cause crosstalk and thus be maladaptive (Ruthruff
et al., 2001), as mentioned earlier. In conclusion, research to date has not been able to
demonstrate clear evidence of a general “flexibility” state (the second assumption of
Goschke’s model), nor delineate the cognitive processes that characterize it.
Nevertheless, several possibilities are tenable, and will be explored in the present study.
A few studies have also examined the trade-off between persistence and
flexibility, the third assumption of Goschke’s model. Dreisbach & Goschke (2004)
looked at the modulating influence of positive affect on these processes, in light of its
prior association with increased dopaminergic transmission in the prefrontal cortex. They
first trained subjects to respond to stimuli in a given color while ignoring stimuli in
another color. In a second phase, subjects then had to respond to either a new color with
distracter stimuli appearing in the previously task-relevant color (the perseveration
condition) or respond to stimuli in the previously task-irrelevant color with distracter
stimuli appearing in a new color (the leamed-irrelevance condition). The authors
experimentally induced positive affective states by briefly presenting emotionally salient
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pleasant pictures just prior to the target stimulus on every trial. Compared to conditions
in which subjects were shown neutral or negative affect-inducing pictures, these subjects
showed reduced switch costs (second phase RT minus first phase RT) in the
perseveration condition and increased switch costs in the leamed-irrelevance condition.
The authors concluded that this pattern indicates increased flexibility at the expense of
distractibility. Dreisbach et al. (2005) applied this same paradigm to healthy individuals
who differed on neurobiological markers of central dopaminergic function. Two
indicators of elevated dopamine levels, high spontaneous blink rates and the presence of
the DRD4 exon E l 4/7 genotype, were associated with increased flexibility but reduced
persistence. Yogev, Hadar, Gutman, and Sirota (2003), apparently unaware of Goschke’s
model, developed a paradigm similar to the WCST that measured both perseveration and
distractibility. Relative to controls, schizophrenics with mostly negative symptoms
tended to commit more perseverative errors whereas those with mostly positive
symptoms evidenced over-switching, as measured by a ratio between the number of
switching responses to the total number of trials. Together, these studies provide
evidence that dopamine activity modulates the flexibility-persistence balance. However,
of potential importance, so-called flexibility-persistence trade-offs in each of these
studies were observed between-subjects or within-subjects but under different
experimental conditions, rather than simultaneously within the same subjects. In other
words, flexibility- and persistence-related processes were not demonstrated to be truly
anatagonistic.
The least progress has been made towards the model’s fourth prediction - the
persistence-flexibility balance is context-sensitive such that adjustments are made on-line
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in response to changing task demands. To date, only explicit external cues have been
used to manipulate task context (e.g., Dreisbach et al., 2002), easing the demands on
exogenously driven processes. In order to adequately test this hypothesis, one would
need to demonstrate that subjects engage in preparatory processes to facilitate repetition
or switch trial performance, whichever is most adaptive, without being overtly instructed
to do so on a trial by trial basis. This is another aim of the present study.
In summary, executive control research to date has primarily focused on the
discrete process of a task shift - the “reconfiguration” involved in disengaging from one
task and switching to another. Clearly, adaptive functioning in the real world requires not
only the ability to shift our attention when instructed, but also to identify when it is
appropriate to shift versus maintain focus and implement these adjustments as we go
about novel goal-directed behavior. The next step in executive control research, then,
must be to characterize the brain systems that regulate the balance between set-switching
and set-maintenance, and theoretically integrate this system with existing models of
executive functioning (e.g., Norman & Shallice, 1986; Miller & Cohen, 2001). Goschke
has taken an important step in this direction by proposing a theoretical account for how
the persistence-flexibility balance is dynamically regulated. This model is broadly
consistent with most available cognitive and neurophysiological research to date.
However, several of its fundamental assumptions have been subjected to little direct
empirical inquiry, and the model therefore remains “speculative” (Goschke, 2000, p.
351). The main goal of the present study is to empirically evaluate Goschke’s theory by
testing its assumptions in a task-switching paradigm. The present results may also force
expansion of computational models of executive control (Cohen et al., 2004; Gilbert &
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Shallice, 2002) to accommodate more than two mental sets, or “task demand units,” and
clarify some previous equivocal empirical findings (e.g., Dreisbach et al., 2002). Other
potential benefits of this research include improving the clinical assessment of executive
control and helping to characterize attention deficits in various clinical populations.
Individuals with Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder, for example, may be capable
of persistence and flexibility but unable to infer the optimal balance and so maintain set
when it is counterproductive (i.e., perseverate) and switch set when focus is needed (i.e.,
show distractibility).
To evaluate the four main assumptions of Goschke’s model outlined above, I used
the random-cued version of the task-switching paradigm1 and manipulated participants’
expectancies about the forthcoming trial (what to prepare for) to encourage persistenceor flexibility-related preparatory processes. Since explicit cues indicating the probability
of an upcoming task (as in Dreisbach et al., 2002) are largely nonexistent outside the
laboratory and ease the demands on executive control, I wished to develop a more
ecologically valid paradigm in which the task context could be altered without explicitly
instructing subjects to modify their preparatory strategy on a trial by trial basis. One way
to do this is to manipulate the frequency and thus subjective probability of
switch/repetition trials. When repetition trials are relatively common, setmaintenance/persistence related processes should be active during the RCI. When switch
trials are common, deploying set-shifting/flexibility related processes during each RCI
would maximize efficiency on most trials.

1 Even though the random-cued version o f the task-switching paradigm is not generally associated with topdown control (Logan & Bundensen, 2003), manipulating participants’ expectancies regarding the
forthcoming trial and lengthening the RCI will allow for the activation o f top-down processes prior to the
task cue (i.e., during the RCI).
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General Method
Participants
All participants were undergraduate students at the University of W indsor and
were awarded bonus course credit as compensation. They spoke English fluently and did
not meet any of the following exclusion criteria (by self-report): (1) history of head
trauma or other neurological illness, (2) formal diagnosis of learning disability or
Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder, (3) current mood, anxiety, or psychotic
disorder, (4) color blindness.
Materials
The stimulus set resembled the WCST (Grant & Berg, 1948) cards. They were
comprised of boxes containing geometric figures that differed on three dimensions: color
(red, yellow, blue, and green), shape (square, circle, triangle, and plus sign), and number
(one to four). Four reference stimuli were made up of orthogonal combinations of the
three dimensions: one green square, two blue plus signs, three red circles, and four
yellow triangles. These are shown in Figure 1. The experimental task was to match
target stimuli to the correct reference stimulus based on a specified dimension (e.g.,
color). The target stimuli were 24 unique combinations of the three dimensions that
shared attributes with three out of the four reference stimuli2. Thus, each target stimulus
was the same color as one of the reference stimuli, the same shape as another, the same
number as a third, and bore no resemblance to the last one (e.g., see Figure 1). Since the
task-irrelevant features (e.g., color and number if the shape task is cued) are always
associated with different responses, they can be considered “incompatible noise” (Gratton
2 All possible combinations o f four levels o f the three dimensions (color, shape, and number) yield 64
distinct stimuli. Four o f these are identical to the reference stimuli, 36 overlap with two o f the reference
stimuli, and 24 (those retained for the present study) overlap with three o f the reference stimuli.
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et a l, 1992).
The four reference stimuli, presented just below each target stimulus in a 400 X
560 pixel display with a white background, corresponded to four keyboard keys (C, V, B,
and N). This (topographically congruent) mapping is also illustrated in Figure 1. To
indicate a match between a target and the “four yellow triangles” reference stimulus, for
example, participants would press the “N” key. Stimulus presentation and data collection
were achieved through SuperLab software (Cedrus Corporation), run on an IBM Pentium
II desktop computer.
Procedure
The experiment began with written and oral instructions on how to perform each
of the tasks and the response-keyboard mappings. Participants then performed a practice
pure-block containing 20 trials for each of the three tasks (color, shape, number) and then
a practice mixed-block of 60 trials in which task order was random (i.e., 120 practice
trials in total). All of these blocks had a CSI of 100 ms and a RCI of 300 ms. After each
response, feedback about its accuracy was provided. If correct, the word “CORRECT’
was displayed for 200 ms. If incorrect, the word “INCO RRECT’ was similarly displayed.
Note that this 200 ms was part of the 300 ms RCI.
For the test phase, participants performed several different blocks in a
counterbalanced order, each 160 trials in length, with equal representation of the three
task types (i.e., approximately 53 trials of each of the color, shape, and number task).
The CSI was held constant at 100 ms, as to not allow for post-cue preparation (see
Meiran, 1996). That is, any preparatory processes will have to be carried out before the
presentation of the cue indicating which task is forthcoming (and therefore should not be
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task-specific in the case of switch trials). All participants completed a block with 75%
switches (and 25% repetitions; referred to as the “high-switch block” hereafter) and one
with 25% switches (and 75% repetitions; “high-repetition block”). Both had a RCI of
1000 ms, which has been shown to be adequate for preparation in the task-switching
paradigm (Rogers & Monsell, 1995). One second has also been shown to be optimal in
prepared RT paradigms (e.g., Stuss et al., 2005). Participants were encouraged to briefly
rest in between the blocks.
Trials proceeded as follows. After the RCI, a cue appeared in the middle of the
screen to indicate the forthcoming task {COLOR, SHAPE, or NUMBER). 100 ms later,
the stimulus appeared just above the cue and both remained on the screen until a response
was made. The four reference stimuli were always presented just below the cue, in the
same relative location as the keyboard responses. When a response was pressed, the cue,
target stimulus, and reference stimuli all immediately disappeared, signaling the onset of
the next RCI. A fixation cross appeared on the screen at the location of the task name for
the duration of the RCI. No feedback was provided during this phase of the experiment.
This sequence of events is depicted in Figure 2.
Following completion of the experimental blocks, participants were asked several
questions as part a manipulation check (see Appendix A) and then debriefed.
Data Analysis
The dependent variables were RT and error rate, measuring speed and accuracy,
respectively. Trials were classified as “repetition” trials if the immediately preceding
trial (N - 1) involved the same task and as “switch” trials if the N - 1 task was different.
Average RT and error rates were computed separately for these two trial types, for each
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participant, at each combination of levels of the independent variables. Because a
preliminary exploration of the data revealed that RTs were positively skewed, within and
across blocks, the median was thought to be a more appropriate measure of central
tendency. This made the standard practice of deleting outlier trials with an arbitrary cut
off (e.g., with RT > 3000 ms) superfluous. The percentage of errors was also moderately
positively skewed and so was transformed via a square root function.
When discussed below, the assumptions for all parametric statistical tests were
met except where explicitly stated otherwise. The methodological design ensured equal
sample sizes and independence of observations. Departures from univariate and
multivariate normality were corrected with data transformations as necessary. In cases
where the assumption of sphericity was not met (Mauchly’s Test of Sphericity was
significant at p < .05), the degrees of freedom were adjusted to a more conservative level
based on the Greenhouse-Geisser estimate of epsilon. For the analyses that included a
between-subjects factor (block order), any heterogeneity of covariance matrices was
modest at worst, and should not be problematic given the equal group sizes.
Alpha was set at .05 for omnibus tests. Bonferroni-corrected t-tests were used for
pairwise comparisons because they are reasonably powerful when only a small number of
contrasts are performed and yet they keep the family wise alpha level at or below .05,
even with severe violations of the sphericity assumption (Stevens, 2002). For planned
comparisons, alpha was corrected for the number of pairwise tests performed, whereas
for post-hoc tests, alpha was corrected for all possible pairwise contrasts.
Also of note, Cohen’s d was always computed using the pooled standard
deviation in the denominator, and the 95% confidence intervals surrounding each mean
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RT value in Figures 5 and 6 were computed using Loftus and M ason’s (1994) formula for
multifactor within-subjects designs, separately for repetition and switch trials.
In each experiment, an outlier analysis was first conducted to identify any
participants who may not be representative of the sample, possibly due to inadequate
motivation, somnolence, an unreported neurocognitive disorder, or some other factor.
Next, a set of exclusion criteria was applied to the trials. The first ten trials of each block
were excluded because they were considered a “warm-up” period in which subjects
would presumably establish expectancies based on their perceptions of the relative
frequency of task repetitions and task switches that would guide the response strategies
for the remaining 150 trials of the block. This accounted for a loss of 6.3% of the data.
Trials that were errors or immediately followed errors were not analyzed for speed
(overall error rates were 6.3%, 7.8%, and 6.9% for Experiments 1, 2, and 3, respectively).
This was due to the fact that the task performed on error trials could not be known, and
therefore their classification as repetition or switch trials could not be determined; since
this classification is based on concordance (or discordance) between the present trial and
the N - 1 trial, trials immediately following errors could also not be classified.
Switch trials will be referred to as probable switches in the high-switch blocks
and as improbable switches in the high-repetition blocks because the global probability of
a switch trial is high and low in these blocks, respectively. Correspondingly, repetition
trials will be referred to as probable repetitions in the high-repetition blocks and as
improbable repetitions in the high-switch blocks.
Experiment 1
To ensure the involvement of executive control in task preparation, the paradigm
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must make it so that preparatory processes have to be endogenously triggered rather than
explicitly cued. As mentioned above, the task-context could covertly change to promote
shifts towards either end of the persistence-flexibility spectrum with an unwarned
blockwise manipulation of the repetition:switch trial ratio. Encoding frequency
-i

information is automatic (Hasher & Zacks, 1979; 1984) . It is resilient to normal aging
(Sanders, Wise, Liddle, & Murphy, 1990) and even dementia o f the Alzheimer’s type
(Wiggs, Martin, & Sunderland, 1997). Previous studies have shown that participants can
make use of frequency information to optimize their performance through strategic
processing (e.g., Gratton, Coles, & Donchin, 1992; Logan & Zbrodoff, 1979). Therefore,
a high frequency of repetition trials (relative to switch trials) should promote persistencerelated processes during each RCI, whereas a high frequency of switch trials (relative to
repetition trials) should promote flexibility-related processes during each RCI.
A potential problem with this paradigm is the possible confound between the
frequency of each trial type and practice effects (Dreisbach et al., 2002). By varying the
frequency of switch trials within a block, the amount of practice with switch and
repetition trials was also varied. Though participants will have performed the same
number of trials of each type by the end of the experiment, they will be differentially
practiced with repetition and switch trials at most points during the experiment. No
confound is anticipated based on previous research examining practice effects by
comparing repeated trials within a run or by comparing blocks over the course of the
experiment. Specifically, Rogers & Monsell (1995) found no evidence for micropractice
effects within a run of repetition trials. Mean RT for the first, second, and third repetition
in a run did not differ. Additionally, Meiran (1996) demonstrated that extensive practice
3 But can be improved by conscious processing (Sanders, Gonzalez, Murphy, Liddle, & Vitina, 1987).
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produces linear decreases in shift costs when no preparation time (defined as the CSI) is
provided, but no practice effects were observed when the CSI was long. Therefore, it
seems that cue-stimulus associations become strengthened with long-term practice, but
preparatory processes do not get more efficient (Meiran, 1996). Another study found
decreasing RTs with increasing practice but a null interaction between practice and trial
type (switch versus repetition; Dreisbach et al., 2002). In spite of this evidence, to be
safe, any effect of long-term practice in the present study was eliminated by
counterbalancing (see Methods section). Also, the design of the present study allows for
an evaluation of the magnitude of practice effects, since predictions based on practice
effects run counter to some of the hypotheses4.
The blocks with disproportions of switch and repetition trials were compared to a
control block that has an equal ratio of switch and repetition trials. Setting the probability
of a switch/repetition to 50% should remove the predictability of task order and thus deny
subjects foreknowledge of what to prepare for (a repetition or switch). With no
foreknowledge of trial order, participants could adopt three different strategies during the
RCI (Sohn & Carlson, 1998). They could (1) maintain set on every trial and be well
prepared for repetitions but very slow for switches, (2) guess at the next task and prepare
for a switch to that task, leaving them in a good position if that task happens to come, but
in poor shape otherwise, or (3) not prepare and simply wait for the cue. Participants can
be expected to adopt the latter approach based on previous research (e.g., Sohn &
Carlson, 1998) and also because it is most effective overall (Gratton et al., 1992).

4 For example, consider the administration o f one block with frequent switches follow ed by another with
infrequent switches. Having just completed the frequent-switching block, subjects would be
disproportionately practiced with switch trials. Consequently, switch costs in the subsequent (low
frequency) block should be small. However, switch costs would be predicted to be large in the second
block on the basis o f Goschke’s theory.
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Contrasts between this equal-proportioned block and the high-repetition/switch blocks
should elucidate the distinctions between preparing to repeat/switch, not preparing to
repeat/switch, and preparing to not repeat/switch.
Method
Participants
Twenty undergraduate students at the University of W indsor voluntarily
participated in this study. They ranged in age from 18 to 27 years (median = 19). The
majority (84%) were female.
Procedure
After completing the practice phase (described above), participants worked
through the high-switch and high-repetition blocks in a counterbalanced order, before (n
= 10) or after (n = 10) the equal-proportioned block. RCI was always 1000 ms. This
made for a 3 (block) X 2 (trial type) design. Participants were not informed of the
blockwise manipulation. Rather, each block was introduced in the same generic manner,
e.g., “here is the next block.” Therefore, the block-to-block transitions should have been
viewed as mere breaks in a long experiment rather than the end of one set of experimental
conditions and the beginning of different conditions.
Results
Data screening
Boxplots of global (across all blocks) mean RTs identified one subject as a clear
outlier. This participant fell 5.94 standard deviations above the sample mean.
Interestingly, he reported being only “6 out of 10” concerned with answering as fast as he
could on the manipulation check questionnaire, which was markedly different from the
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rest of the sample {M = 8.1, SD = 1.1). This suggests insufficient motivation or an
inordinately strong accuracy-for-speed tradeoff. Regardless, this subject was excluded
from the analyses reported below.
Preliminary Analyses
Practice blocks. The practice blocks were first subjected to analysis. A one-way
within-subjects ANOVA with task-type as the independent variable produced a
significant main effect, F(1.36, 24.41) = 51.94, p < .00001, r\p2 = .743. Bonferronicorrected paired t-tests revealed significant differences between the shape block and the
other two blocks (both p < .00001), but no difference between the color and number
blocks (p = .994). Errors were very infrequent and extremely positively skewed (most
participants made no errors). Since all participants completed these three practice blocks
in the same order, blockwise comparisons may be complicated by practice effects, and
more likely, proactive/retroactive interference. Therefore, the enticing conclusion that
the shape task was more difficult than the other two tasks must be withheld for now.
The 60-trial mixed practice block was analyzed next. According to a paired t-test,
repetition trials were performed faster than switch trials, f(18) = 2.79, p = .012, Cohen’s d
= .414. Participants also made more errors on switch trials compared with repetition
trials, t(18) = 4.88, p = .00012, Cohen’s d = 1.346. In other words, both the RT and error
rate data supported significant switch cost effects. A one-way within-subjects ANOVA
with post-hoc tests revealed a main effect for task type [F(2, 36) = 18.19, p < .00001, r|p2
= .503]. It also showed that the shape task was performed slower than the color and
number tasks (both p < .0001), which did not differ from each other (p = .499). This
finding further lends credence to the hypothesis that the shape task was harder than the
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other two tasks. Visual inspection of box-plots of RT by trial number for this block (see
Figure 3) did not reveal a linearly decreasing trend, suggesting trivial within-block
practice effects.
Although the same practice blocks were administered in subsequent experiments,
there is no reason to believe that the results would be any different. The above analyses
were therefore not repeated for each experiment.
Replication o f basic task-switching phenomena. To ensure that there was nothing
peculiar about the stimulus set, stimulus-response mappings, matching tasks, or other
idiosyncrasies of the method employed in this study, I first examined whether some
common findings in the literature would replicate. In virtually all previous studies
employing the random-cued version of the task-switching paradigm, the proportion of
repetition and switch trials is equal. It therefore seems appropriate to attempt to replicate
major findings from these studies by analyzing only the equal-proportioned block in the
present study.
The most robust finding in these studies is a large switch cost - switch trials are
performed slower than repetition trials (e.g., Meiran, 1996), even when the RCI exceeds
one second (Meiran et al., 2000). This hypothesis was tested with a dependent samples ttest, which revealed a significant switch cost of about 100 ms, t(18) = 4.01, p = .001,
Cohen’s d = .775. The same contrast with the square-root transformed error rates was not
quite significant, t{ 18) = 1.64, p = .118, Cohen’s d = .369.
The correct response on a repetition trial may be the same or different from the
correct response on the preceding trial. That is, participants may be required to repeat
tasks and responses or repeat tasks but press a different response. The same is true for

31

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

switch trials. To examine the effect of repeating versus switching responses and its
potential interaction with repeating versus switching tasks, these variables were entered
into a response type by trial type within-subjects ANOVA (for their descriptive statistics,
see Table 1). There was a large main effect for trial type [F (l, 18) = 27.14, p < .00006,
T]p2 = .601; repetitions < switches], no main effect for response type [F (l, 18) = .70, p =
.413, rip2 = .038; repetitions = switches], and a large interaction effect [F (l, 18) = 21.16, p
= .0002, rip2 = .540]. The latter indicated that response repetitions were facilatory for task
repetitions but inhibitory for task switches. For the same ANOVA with error data, there
was only a small main effect for response repetition [F (l, 18) = 6.25, p = .022, tiP2 =
.258], indicating that errors were higher for response repetitions than response switches.
Roger and Monsell (1995) obtained these same RT findings, and offered a few tentative
explanations for why they appear. Responding to a stimulus may increase the
association between the relevant stimulus attribute category and response while
decreasing the association between that response and other stimulus attributes.
Alternatively, a mechanism may exist that is designed to prevent perseverative
responding. This system might check the planned response against the just-executed
response, and if a match is detected, a time-consuming rechecking of the decision would
be triggered; repetition priming would more than overcome these inhibitory effects on
repetition trials.
An effect of task recency is another seminal finding (Ruthruff et al., 2001).
Ruthruff and colleagues realized that switch trials differ with respect to how recently the
switched-to task was performed, varying from a minimum of 2 trials ago to 10 or more in
many task-switching experiments. They deconstructed the binary repetition-switch trial
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distinction, instead classifying trials based on the number of preceding trials since the
task was last performed (i.e., task recency = 1 for repetitions trials and task recency > 1
for switch trials). The authors found a significant effect for task recency - RT increased
linearly with the number of trials since the task was last performed. However, they used
univalent stimuli (non-overlapping stimulus sets associated with the different tasks), and
there is good reason to speculate that this finding would not replicate with multivalent
stimuli (as in the present study). By their own admission, a consequence of using
univalent stimuli was that “participants presumably never had to inhibit processing of the
inappropriate task” (pg. 1415). With multi-affordance stimuli, backward inhibition is
needed to reduce proactive interference (e.g., Mayr & Keele, 2000). The effects of
backward inhibition may offset or even outweigh any beneficial effect of task repetition.
Consistent with this hypothesis, Figure 4a seems to shows a switch cost (difference
between 1 and 2), but no strong trend of linearly increasing RTs from 2 to 5 (within
switch trials). There is also no such trend in the error data (see Figure 4b).
As highlighted in the analysis of the practice blocks, the three tasks do not appear
to have been equal in difficulty. Moreover, unequal tasks may show asymmetrical
switching costs (Allport et al., 1994). A task type by trial type (3 x 2) within-subjects
ANOVA revealed large main effects for task type [F(2, 18) = 58.78, p < .00001, r|p2 =
.874] and trial type [F (l, 18) = 18.28,p = .00046, r|p2 = .504], as well as an interaction
effect, F(2, 17) = 5.40, p = .015, riP2 = .389. Follow-up post-hoc tests revealed that shape
task was performed slower than the color [/(18) = 11.11 ,p < .00001, Cohen’s d = 1.593]
and number [f(18) = 8.67, p < .00001, Cohen’s d = 1.442] tasks, and that the latter two
did not differ, t(18) = .43, p = .68, Cohen’s d = .061. Post-hoc exploration of the
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interaction effect revealed that the only significant difference was between the switch
cost for the number and color tasks, r(18) = 3.45, p = .003, Cohen’s d = .783. Descriptive
statistics are presented in Table 2. Errors were too infrequent and extremely positively
skewed, so only group means are reported. Switch costs appear smallest for the color
task, largest for the number task, and intermediate for the shape task. Allport et al.
(1994) suggested that more overleamed task sets (e.g., reading words) require greater
backward inhibition than novel task sets (e.g., naming the color of the ink words are
printed in), and are therefore harder to switch back to, since this extra inhibition must be
overcome. It is not intuitively obvious why classifying objects based on their quantity,
by this account, is a more overleamed task than classifying them based on their shape,
and so on. This is especially odd given that the difficulty gradient (in terms of overall
RT) for these three tasks followed a different pattern. Importantly, the task distribution
was balanced in all experimental blocks, so even widely discrepant switch costs would
not systematically influence the below results.
Main Analyses
R T data. Descriptive statistics are provided in Table 3. A 3 (block) X 2 (trial
type) within-subjects ANOVA revealed a main effect for trial type [F (l, 18) = 41.06, p <
2

♦

♦

.00001, rjp = .695], indicating that repetitions were performed faster than switches. The
main effect for block was not significant [F(2, 17) = .31, p = .741, r\p2 = .035], suggesting
that the overall mean RT for high-switch, equal-proportioned, and high-repetition blocks
did not differ. There was also a robust interaction effect [F(2, 17) = 16.90, p = .00009,
r)p = .665], plotted in Figure 5. This interaction reflected decreasing switch costs with
increasing probability of a switch trial - they were 182, 104, and 74 ms in the high-
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repetition, equal-proportioned, and high-switch blocks, respectively. Planned
comparisons were used to examine the probability effects more closely. Only the mean
repetition RTs for the high-switch and high-repetition blocks significantly differed, t{ 18)
= 3.17, p = .005, Cohen’s d = .545. That is, probable repetitions were performed faster
than improbable repetitions. All other comparisons were in the predicted numerical
direction, but non-significant at a Bonferonni-corrected alpha of .017.
In most paradigms (including the present one), repetition and switch trials are
defined by the immediately preceding trial, ignoring events before it. A given trial is
simply classified as a repetition trial if the previous trial involved the same task and is
classified as a switch trial if the previous trial involved a different task. This method
equates repetition trials that are preceded by one, two, three, or more trials involving the
same task, which may be inappropriate if there are systematic RTs trends within runs of
repetitions or switches (Meiran et al., 2000). In the present data set, however, there was a
small effect size between the mean RT for the first trial of a run of repetitions and later
trials in a run (averaged), Cohen’s d = 0.237. The effect size for the same comparison,
but with switch trials, was only 0.002. Spearman’s rho correlations between RT and
position in a run (as a continuous variable) were also very low, -.126 for repetition and .015 for switch trials. Since RT did not appear to systematically differ by position in a
run for either repetition or switch trials, omitting trials after the first position in the run
should have little effect on the results. When they were omitted, the same pattern of
results was obtained. Specifically, a within-subjects ANOVA revealed a main effect for
trial type [F (l, 18) = 31.27, p = .00003, r|p2 = .635], a non-significant main effect for
block [F(2, 17) = .42, p = .664, r|p2 = .047], and a strong interaction effect, F{2, 17) =
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6.21, p = .009, rip2 = .422. For these reasons, all subsequent analyses will include trials in
any position of a run, i.e. adopt the standard definition of repetition and switch trials.
Another reason for this decision is that limiting measurement of performance on
repetition trials to the first trial of a run will underestimate the switch cost whenever task
order is not fixed (Monsell, Sumner, & Waters, 2003), as in the present paradigm.
Because expectancy may well carry over from one block to the next, experimental
block order should be analyzed as another independent variable. Participants who
completed the high-switch before the high-repetition block were compared to those who
completed these two blocks in the opposite order. In a block X trial type X block order
split-plot ANOVA (the equal-proportioned block was not included in this analysis to
enhance interpretability), the only significant main effect was for trial type, F( 1, 17) =
45.72, p < .00001, rip2 = .729. In contrast, RT did not differ by block [F (l, 17) = .55, p =
.466, rip2 = .032] or block order [F (l, 17) = .62, p = .44, r|p2= .035], The block by trial
type interaction was significant, F (l, 17) = 32.91, p < .00001, rip2 = .659, but the other
two-way interactions were both p > .05. The three-way interaction was also non
significant [F (l, 17) = 1.23, p = .283, r\p2 = .067], suggesting that the probability effects
were similar for both block orders. However, post-hoc tests revealed isolated probability
effects for switch trials in the subsample that completed the high-repetition block first
[r(8) = 4.45, p = .002, Cohen’s d = 1.00], and isolated probability effects for repetition
trials in the subsample that completed the high-switch block first [f(9) = 3.40, p = .008,
Cohen’s d = .681].
One possible line o f explanation to account for this finding is that subjects who
performed the high-switch block first may have reached ceiling levels on switch trials
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and so benefited no further in the second block, whereas their performance on repetition
trials (of which they performed few in the first block) improved in the subsequent highrepetition condition. Likewise, subjects who performed the high-repetition block first
may have achieved ceiling RT on repetition trials but not switch trials, and then showed
improvement only on switch trials in the second block. Of course, this would only be
plausible if practice effects were minimal for the less frequent trial type within the first
block and then substantial within the second block, when that trial type was more
frequent. The data do not support this hypothesis. The high-switch and high-repetition
blocks were divided into quarters. Because there were not enough valid trials (only about
5 to 7, on average) to compute reliable means for a within-subject analysis, only the
group level data was analyzed. Means for the groups who performed the high-repetition
block first and the high-switch block first were computed for the second (46th to 80th trial)
and fourth (116th to 150th trial) quarters of each block, separately for repetitions and
switches. A practice effect would be indicated by a significant RT decrease from the
second to the forth quarter. Within-block RT differences were small and inconsistent
(some in the numerical direction of practice effects and others in the direction of fatigue
effects). Alternative explanations are explored in Experiment 3.
Error rates. The block by trial type within-subjects ANOVA revealed a main
effect for trial type [F (l, 18) = 11.84, p = .003, qp2 = .397] but not block [F(2, 17) = 1.66,
p = .22, r)p2 = .164], The interaction effect was also significant, F(2, 17) = 4.54, p = .026,
rip = .348. None of the pairwise contrasts reached significance. O f note, the numerical
trends for the (transformed) error rates were in the opposite direction as predicted (and
the RT findings) - switch costs were largest in the high-switch block (1.2% error rate
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difference), and smaller in the equal-proportioned (.4%) and high-repetition (.3%) blocks,
suggesting that a speed-accuracy tradeoff may contribute to (but not fully explain) the
RT results. As with the RT data, excluding all trials that were not in the first position of a
run did not significantly alter the results. A block X trial type X block order split-plot
ANOVA revealed that block order did not influence the probability effects.
Errors on switch trials can be classified as perseverative or non-perseverative (i.e.,
random) in a similar manner to the WCST. An incorrect response on a switch trial is
classified as perseverative if it would have been correct for the task cued on the previous
trial5. Such an error may occur as the result of maintaining set during the RCI and getting
“caught” erroneously applying this set to the forthcoming target stimulus, i.e., performing
the no-longer-appropriate task. Since there are three possible incorrect response
alternatives on a given switch trial, the chance probability of an error being of the
perseverative type is about 33%. The percentage of all switch trial errors that were
perseverative errors were calculated for each block: 48.1% in the high-switch block,
68.4% in the equal-proportioned block, and 69.5% in the high-repetition block.
According to chi-square tests, the high-switch block significantly differed from the equalproportioned block ft2 (1) = 10.05, p = .0015], but the equal-proportioned block did not
differ from the high-repetition block ft2 (1) = .02, p = .882], Thus, perseverative errors
were far more common in the blocks where repetitions occurred with at least equal
frequency to switches. O f note, all of these values fell outside of the 95% confidence
intervals of the binomial distributions based on a .33 probability of a perseveration and

5 It should be noted that Meiran & Daichman (2005) appropriately criticized this method o f classifying
errors. They argued that a so-called perseverative error (as classified above) may indeed be an instance o f
correctly performing the incorrect task, however, it may also indicate an incorrect response to the correct
task - there is no way to tell the difference.
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where the number of events was the total number of errors committed (which varied
across the blocks). In fact, the binomial probability of obtaining the observed number of
perseverative errors was less .001 for all three blocks.
Manipulation check. When asked if they noticed any differences between the
different parts (blocks) of the experiment, only one quarter (26%) reported a difference in
the proportion of repetition and switch trials.
Summary of Main Findings
In the present experiment, the probability of a switch/repetition was covertly
manipulated within-subjects. The pattern of RTs indicated an interaction between
probability of a switch/repetition and trial type (switch vs. repetition), with large and
statistically robust switch costs (182 ms) in the high-repetition block and negligible
switch costs (74 ms) in the high-switch block. Detailed exploration of this interaction
revealed probability effects (probable RT < improbable RT) for repetitions, but not
switches. RTs for unpredictable repetition trials fell intermediate to probable and
improbable repetition trials, but were not statistically distinguishable from them. Switch
trials exhibited the same pattern. When block order was added as a between-subjects
variable, it modified the pattern (but not the magnitude) of the probability of a
switch/repetition by trial type interaction. Specifically, isolated probability effects for
repetition trials were found at one block order and isolated probability effects for switch
trials were found at the other block order. Finally, perseverative errors were found to be
less likely in the high-switch block compared to the other two blocks.

39

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Experiment 2
As Yeung & Monsell (2003) point out, a comparison between short and long
interstimulus intervals is necessary to be sure participants made use of the preparation
time. It can also rule out exogenous factors as (at least partially) explaining the pattern of
findings in Experiment 1. If the probability effects reported above were actually
endogenously driven, as hypothesized, they should disappear when preparation time is
not provided, since under these conditions, participants will have some foreknowledge of
the upcoming trial type but will not be able to make use of this knowledge, since active
preparation is time-consuming. In statistical terms, the interaction between trial type and
block (probability of a switch/repetition) demonstrated above (when RCI = 1000 ms)
should not be replicated when the RCI is only 100 ms. As well, if top-down setmaintenance processes were responsible for the elevated rate of perseverative errors in
the high-repetition block in Experiment 1, this type of switch error should be no more
frequent in the high-repetition block than the high-switch block when the RCI is short.
Method
Participants
Twenty undergraduate students at the University of Windsor voluntarily
participated in this study. They ranged in age from 18 to 23 years (median = 19). The
majority (58%) were female.
Materials
Identical to Experiment 1.
Procedure
After completing the practice phase (described above), participants worked
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through high-switch and high-repetition blocks at an RCI of 1000 ms in a
counterbalanced order, before (n = 10) or after (n = 10) high-switch and high-repetition
blocks at an RCI of 100 ms, also in a counterbalanced order. As in Experiment 1, they
were not informed of these blockwise manipulations.
Results
Data Screening
Boxplots of global (across all blocks) mean RTs did not identify any participants
as outliers. All twenty participants were therefore retained for the analyses below.
R T Data
Descriptive statistics are provided in Table 4. A three-way completely withinsubjects ANOVA was conducted, with trial type, percent switch, and RCI as independent
variables. This procedure yielded significant main effects for trial type [switch >
repetition; F (l, 19) = 67.11, p < .00001, riP2 = .779], block [high-switch > high-repetition;
F (l, 19) = 11.41,p = .003, T|p2 = .375], and RCI [short > long; F (l, 19) = 17.33, p =
.00053, t|p = .477]. None of the interactions were significant, except for trial type by
block, F (l, 19) = 9.64, p = .006, r|p = .337. To more closely examine the trial type by
block interaction, separate 2 X 2 ANOVAs were run for each RCI. Importantly, there
was a significant interaction at the long RCI [F (l, 19) = 12.66, p = .002, r\p2 = .400] but
not at the short RCI [F (l, 19) = 2.27, p = .148, r|p2 = .107]. Pairwise contrasts indicated
that the former interaction was driven by probability effects for repetition trials [r(19) =
4.12, p = .001, Cohen’s d = .748], i.e., probable repetitions for performed faster than
improbable repetitions. Probability effects for switch trials were non-significant [f(19) =
.04, p = .97, Cohen’s d = .008],
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This null probability effect for switch trials reflects an averaging of modest
probability effects in the group that completed the high-switch block second [t(9) = 1.61,
p = .142, Cohen’s d = .410] and a reverse effect for those who completed the high-switch
block first [t(9) = 2.32, p = .046, Cohen’s d = .507]. Also of note, probability effects for
repetitions were considerably stronger in the group that completed the high-repetition
block second [t(9) = 4.71, p = .001, Cohen’s d = 1.20] compared to those who completed
it first [t(9) = 1.69, p = .126, Cohen’s d = .387], Thus, the data for the long RCI
conditions followed the same pattern as in Experiment 1, with block order modifying the
nature of the interaction between block (probability of a switch/repetition) and trial type.
Error Rates
The three-way ANOVA with transformed error data revealed main effects for
RCI [short > long; F (l, 19) = 6.96, p = .007, r\p2 = .326], trial type [switch > repetition;
F (l, 19) = 5.06, p = .031, rip2 = .223], but not block [F (l, 19) = .32, p = .488, r)p2 = .025],
The trial type by block [F (l, 19) = 5.27, p = .033, riP2 = .217] and trial type by block by
RCI [F (l, 19) = 4.26,/? = .008, r)p2 = .318] interactions were also significant.
At the long RCI, perseverative errors were far more common in the highrepetition block (77.4%) than in the high-switch block (52.2%) [x2 (1) = 12.48,/? =
.0004], as in Experiment 1. However, as predicted, this pattern did not hold in the short
RCI conditions [x2 (1) = .12, /? = .73]; the percentage of switch errors that were of the
perseverative type was similar in the high-repetition (58.6%) and high-switch (56.3%)
blocks.
Manipulation Check
When asked if they noticed any differences between the four different parts
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(blocks) of the experiment, 65% spontaneously reported a varying RCI and 40% reported
noticing a difference in the proportion of repetition and switch trials.
Summary of Main Findings
This experiment replicated the probability of a switch/repetition by trial type
interaction when the RCI was long (as in Experiment 1), but showed that this interaction
could be sharply attenuated by reducing the RCI. The difference between perseverative
errors in the high-repetition and high-switch blocks was also replicated at the long RCI
but eliminated at the short RCI.
Experiment 3
This experiment was essentially a replication of Experiment 1, except that
participants were explicitly informed of the characteristics of each block (i.e., the
probability of a repetition/switch) and instructed to make use of this information as best
they could. This follow-up study was conducted for several reasons. First and foremost,
overtly manipulating expectancies may clarify the above results to the extent that it
produces larger effect sizes and more clear-cut patterns. Since the equal-proportioned
switch block did not significantly differ from the other two in Experiment 1, it is unclear
whether the observed probability effects were due to RT-costs (i.e., slowing on
improbable repetitions/switches) or -benefits (e.g., facilitation on probable
repetitions/switches) relative to a baseline - repetitions and switches in the equalproportioned block. That is, the distinction between preparing to repeat/switch tasks, not
preparing to repeat/switch tasks, and preparing to not repeat/switch tasks was blurred.
Experiment 1 also revealed unanticipated block order effects that may have only emerged
because of the covert nature of the blockwise manipulation. The effect of explicit
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instructions on these block order effects may help elucidate their cause. Importantly,
even with instructions at the beginning of each block, persistence- and flexibility-related
processes would still need to be endogenously triggered on a trial-by-trial basis.
Method
Participants
Eighteen undergraduate students at the University of W indsor voluntarily
participated in this study. They ranged in age from 18 to 49 years (median = 21). The
majority (72%) were female.
Materials
Identical to Experiment 1.
Procedure
Participants were first given the same general instructions and practice blocks as
in Experiment 1. When introducing the next phase of the study, participants were
informed that there would be important differences between the three experimental
blocks, and that these differences would be explained at the beginning of each block. For
each one, participants were told the global probability of a repetition/switch trial in that
block as well as how they may translate this information to local probability - “after you
perform a certain task on any trial in this block, it is likely that you will be asked to
perform [that same task or a different task] on the very next trial.” Examples were
provided. Finally, they were instructed to use this probability information to prepare for
each upcoming trial during the brief pauses that precede them. Only after subjects were
able to accurately paraphrase these instructions were they allowed to begin the block.
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Participants in this experiment completed high-repetition and high-switch blocks in a
counterbalanced order, before (n = 9) or after (n = 9) an equal-proportioned block.
Results
Data Screening
Boxplots of global (across all blocks) mean RTs identified one participant as an
outlier. This subject’s mean RT fell 2.3 standard deviations from the group mean, even
though they reported a high level of motivation (10/10) to try their hardest on routine
post-experiment questioning. Data for the remaining 17 participants were analyzed.
R T Data
Descriptive statistics are provided in Table 5. A 3 (block) X 2 (trial type) withinsubjects ANOVA revealed no main effect for block [F(2, 15) = 1.20, p = .328, qp2 =
.138], but a large main effect for trial type [switches > repetitions; F( 1, 16) = 54.60, p <
.00001, r(p2 = .773] and a percent by trial type interaction [F(2, 15) = 14.42, p = .00032,
rip2 = .658]. See Figure 6. Planned comparisons revealed that probable repetitions were
performed faster than unpredictable [t(16) = 3.31, p = .004, Cohen’s d = .661] and
improbable repetitions [/(16) = 2.93, p = .010, Cohen’s d = .506], with latter two not
differing [t(16) = 1.17, p = .258, Cohen’s d = .244]. There was a trend for probable
switches to be performed faster than unpredictable [r(16> = 1.88, p = .078, Cohen’s d =
.316] and improbable switches [t(16) = 2.28, p = .037, Cohen’s d = .481], with latter two
not differing [t(16) = .28, p = .780, Cohen’s d = .061]. Thus, it appears that not
preparing to and preparing to not repeat/switch tasks are indistinguishable processes.
(Note that effect sizes obtained for the probable versus improbable comparisons would be
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considered substantial by conventional interpretation, despite the marginal statistical
significance associated with them.)
With block order added as a between-subjects factor (and the equal-proportioned
block removed to facilitate interpretation, as in Experiment 1), a three-way block by trial
type by block order split-plot ANOVA revealed no main effects for block [F (l, 15) = .08,
p = .784, rjp2 = .005] or block order [F (l, 15) = 1.77, p = .203, rip2 = .106], but a large
main effect for trial type [switches > repetitions; F (l, 15) = 76.27, p < .00001, r|p2 =
.836]. As expected, there was a significant block by trial type interaction [F (l, 15) =
29.92, p = .00007, qp2 = .666]. Block order interacted with block [F (l, 15) = 9.26, p =
.008, r|p2 = .382] but not trial type [F (l, 15) = 1.06, p = .320, r|p2 = .066]. The former
indicates that participants produced relatively faster RTs for the high-repetition block
when it came second and faster RTs on high-switch block when it came second. In other
words, there was an overall improvement in RT from one block to the next. The threeway interaction was non-significant [F (l, 15) = 1.26,p = .279, r|p2 = .078]. However, this
is again misleading because the interactions at each level of the block order variable were
driven by different (opposite) simple main effects. Post-hoc tests revealed isolated
probability effects for switches among participants who completed the high-repetition
block before the high-switch block [t(8) = 3 3 9 , p = .010, Cohen’s d = .945] and isolated
probability effects for repetitions among those who completed the blocks in the reverse
order [t(7) = 4.14, p = .004, Cohen’s d = .925].
Since block order and practice are perfectly confounded, practice effects must be
considered as an alternative explanation for the present replication of isolated RT
differences for repetitions in one subgroup of participants and isolated RT differences for
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switches in the other subgroup. The practice effects hypothesis would predict decreasing
repetition and switch RTs from one block to the next, regardless of the probability of a
repetition/switch in those blocks (i.e., no interaction). If only probability affected RT, on
the other hand, repetition trials should be performed faster in the high-repetition block
compared to the high-switch block and the opposite pattern should be seen for switch
trials, regardless of the administration order of these blocks. Note that these hypotheses
run counter to each other in some cases but make the same prediction in other cases.
Consider the group of participants who completed the high-repetition block before the
high-switch block. The practice effects hypothesis predicts that repetitions and switches
would be faster in the high-switch block relative to the high-repetition block. The
probability effects hypothesis also predicts that switches are faster in the high-switch
block, but that repetitions are slower in the high-switch block. The data show that switch
RT is faster in the high-switch block, consistent with both hypotheses, and that repetition
RT does not differ between the blocks. This latter null finding may reflect that practice
and probability effects canceled each other out.
For this proposition to hold, there would have to be evidence of practice effects
(unconfounded by probability effects) in the data set. A split-plot ANOVA comparing
the equal-proportioned block that was completed first (before the high-switch and highrepetition blocks) and the equal-proportioned block that was completed last revealed a
main effect of trial type [F(l, 17) = 14.78, p = .001, r|p2 = .465], a null interaction [F(l,
17) = .002, p = .965, t)p < .001], and most importantly, a significant between-subjects
effect for order [F(l, 17) = 12.14, p = .003, r\p2 = .417], consistent with practice effects
for both repetitions and switches. Moreover, for participants who completed the equal-
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proportioned block first, there were within-block practice effects, as indicated by a
contrast between mean RT for the first and second halves of this block [F(l, 8) = 11.22, p
= .010, rip2 = .584]. Thus, there is strong evidence for within- and across-block practice
effects over the entire course of the experiment, suggesting that an apparent absence of
practice effects in certain blockwise contrasts really reflects existing practice effects
countered by some other effect related to the inherent differences between blocks, i.e.,
probability effects.
The suggestion that practice and probability effects nullified each other also
assumes that they were approximately equal in magnitude. It logically follows that when
probability effects predict the same RT patterns as practice effects, the magnitude of RT
difference will be approximately double that attributable to probability effects alone. Put
differently, the isolated so-called “probability effects” reported above at each block order
administration will overestimate the true effect of the probability manipulation by about
100%. In other words, the RT difference at each block order should be about double that
for the overall data, collapsed across block order (thereby removing practice effects).
Indeed, the repetition RT difference for participants who completed the high-switch block
first is 150 ms, approximately double that for all participants combined (66 ms; Figure 5).
Also, the switch RT difference for participants who completed the high-repetition block
first is 106 ms, about double that for all participants combined (56 ms; Figure 5).
The most important finding was that probability effects were evident for both
repetition and switch trials in the overall data (collapsing across counterbalanced block
order to remove the influence of practice/fatigue effects), consistent with Goschke’s
model. Of interest, but of no theoretical relevance, when block order was examined as a
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between-subjects variable, practice effects were found to be substantial in our
experimental paradigm, enhancing probability effects (twofold) in some contrasts and
negating them in others.

Error Rates
As with the RT data, a 3 (block) X 2 (trial type) within-subjects ANOVA revealed
no main effect for block [F(2, 16) = 3.01, p = .078, r|p2 = .274], but a large main effect for
trial type [F (l, 17) = 17.05,/? = .001, r|p2 = .501]. However, the interaction effect failed
to reach significance, F(2, 16) = 1.97, /? = .172, r|p2 = .197. For the block by trial type by
block order split-plot ANOVA, the only significant effect was trial type, F ( l, 15) =
13.29,/? = .002, rip2 = .470.
The percentage of all switch errors that were perseverative was 45.9% in the highswitch block, 59.3% in the equal-proportioned block, and 72.9% in the high-repetition
block. The perseverative error rate in high-switch block was significantly lower than in
the equal-proportioned block [x2 (1) = 3.90, p = .048], which was only marginally lower
than the high-repetition block [x2 (1) = 2.83, p = .093]. The difference between highswitch and high-repetition blocks was large [x2 (1) = 12.31,/? = .00045],
Summary of Main Findings
The methodological parameters in this experiment were identical to those in
Experiment 1, except that participants were explicitly told about the probability of a
switch/repetition before starting a block and instructed to use this information to prepare
for each forthcoming trial. A highly similar pattern of findings emerged. Switch costs
were more than twice as large (196 ms) in the high-repetition block compared to the
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high-switch block (74 ms), but this interaction was now driven by significant probability
effects for both repetitions and switches. These simple main effects were of similar
magnitude (Cohen’s d ~ .5). Another important finding was that unpredictable repetition
trials closely resembled improbable repetition trials, which were both performed slower
than probable repetition trials. The same pattern was seen for switch trials. An
examination of block order again revealed that probability effects were found only for
repetition trials in one subgroup of participants, and the opposite pattern was found in the
other subgroup. Follow-up analyses indicated that this was due to the presence of
practice effects that were similar in magnitude to probability effects. These two effects
were additive in certain conditions and cancelled each other out in other conditions. Of
utmost importance, when practice effects were statistically removed, probability effects
remained for repetitions and switches, as predicted. Finally, perseverative errors
increased with the probability of a repetition.
General Discussion
In the present series of experiments, participants’ expectancies concerning the
forthcoming trial were manipulated in the random-cued version of the task-switching
paradigm in order to evaluate four key assumptions of Goschke’s (2000; 2003) model of
the dynamic regulation of executive control. The first of these, that task repetition can be
facilitated by a preparatory state o f persistence, is highly consistent with the robust
finding that probable repetition trials were performed faster than improbable repetition
trials (all experiments). This effect was evident even when probability was covertly
manipulated (Experiment 1). Preparation for a forthcoming repetition was also consistent
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with the finding that the proportion of switch errors that were of the perseverative type
increased with the probability of a repetition (Experiments 1 and 3).
Before concluding full support for this assumption, bottom-up processes must be
ruled out as accounting for the reduced repetition trial RT and increased rate of
perseverative switch errors in the high-repetition block relative to the high-switch block.
Cumulative stimulus-driven task set activation over consecutive task repetitions (i.e.,
repetition priming) may account for why the inappropriate set was highly activated such
that subsequent repetition trials were performed very quickly, or in the case of subsequent
switch trials, perseverative errors were committed. This alternative hypothesis predicts
that perseverative errors would be even more frequent and probability effects on
repetition RT would be even stronger in the short RCI condition relative to the long RCI
condition, since the latter would allow the stimulus-driven activation to dissipate to a
greater extent. This is the opposite of what was found (Experiment 2, long vs. short
RCI). Moreover, RT did not tend to decrease with position in a run of repetition trials
(Experiment 1), further damaging the credibility of this hypothesis. Thus, the present
findings heavily implicate endogenous processes such as sustained activation of the
current task set as characterizing the preparatory state of persistence. This is consistent
with Dreisbach et al.’s (2002) study, in which probability of a forthcoming repetition was
not confounded with the number of consecutive preceding repetition trials, and yet robust
probability effects were observed.
The second assumption of Goschke’s model, that task-switching can be facilitated
by a non-specific preparatory state o f flexibility, was more controversial with respect to
the preexisting literature. In most prior studies, participants switched between two tasks,
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so that when a switch was expected, task-specific preparation could be carried out
(Rogers & Monsell, 1995; Ruthruff et al., 2001; Sohn & Carlson, 2000; but see Dreisbach
& Heider, in press); having just performed Task A, they would prepare for Task B. This
is not relevant to the assumption under question. Having participants switch between
more than two tasks is necessary to study non-specific/generic preparation for a switch getting ready for an upcoming task switch when the particular to-be-switched-to task is
unknown. Not surprisingly, there is solid evidence that task-specific preparation is
superior to generic preparation (e.g., Sohn & Carlson, 2000). However, this still does not
address the prediction made by Goschke’s model that generic preparation is superior to
no preparation, such as under conditions where the forthcoming trial type is completely
random, or unpredictable (regardless of the number of tasks). Dreisbach et al. (2002)
appear to be the first to have tested this prediction, and found that generic preparation is
equivalent to no preparation, i.e., not facilitory. However, in the Dreisbach et al. (2002)
study, multiple tasks were associated with the same stimulus features. An upcoming
switch trial could have involved performing a different task based on the same stimulus
feature or a different task based on a different stimulus feature. Because of the former
possibility, biased processing of particular stimulus features —one tenable account for
how generic preparation could be beneficial, was not advantageous. The methodology in
the present study allowed it to be advantageous, and produced the finding that general
preparation was better than no preparation, at least when the probability of a
switch/repetition was made explicit (Experiment 3). In other words, the current findings
represent the first empirical support for a generic preparatory state of flexibility that
facilitates task-switching.
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The finding that perseverative switch errors occurred at greater than chance
frequency in the high-switch block (albeit with much less frequency than the highrepetition block) suggests that generic preparation for an upcoming switch trial, although
helpful, was less than complete. That is, even when the task context promoted
preparation for an upcoming switch trial during each RCI, and the RT data indicated that
participants indeed did so, they were still unable to overcome the bottom-up activation of
the no-longer-relevant mental set on some occasions. In other words, some degree of
stimulus boundedness or “utilization behavior” appears to be normal. This is consistent
with other studies of neurologically intact subjects (e.g., Robertson et al., 1997; Manly et
al., 2002) that support the notion that perseverative behavior in brain-injured patients is a
disorder of quantity rather than quality. This finding may also indicate that participants
do not fully prepare on every trial, as De Jong (2000) suggests.
According to the third assumption that the processes that underlie persistence and
flexibility are antagonistic, conditions that facilitate repetition trial performance (e.g.,
high repetition trial frequency) will inhibit switch trial performance and vice versa.
Indeed, there was a highly significant interaction between trial type and probability of a
repetition/switch that was supported by opposing simple main effects for both repetitions
and switches, at least in Experiment 3. However, improbable repetitions/switches did not
differ from unpredictable repetitions/switches (Experiments 1 & 3), indicating that
preparing to perform one trial type does impair performance of the other trial type beyond
baseline (i.e., an unprepared state). In other words, performance on repetition trials was
not impeded by expectations that a forthcoming repetition trial is unlikely relative to no
expectations. The same was true for switch trials.
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At first glance, this finding appears incompatible with the several studies reported
above that demonstrate a “trade-off’ between persistence and flexibility. However,
closer scrutiny revealed that these so-called trade-offs were between subjects or withinsubjects between different conditions (repetition/persistence performance measured in
one condition and switching/flexibility measured in another). These prior findings
therefore do not necessarily conflict with the present finding of no trade-off withinsubjects in the same condition.
The implication of this failure to support Goschke’s “antagonistic” assumption is
that persistence- and flexibility-related processes are independent and thus suggests that
they cannot be controlled by a single mechanism, or neural system. Dreisbach and
Goschke (2004) proposed a global mechanism that modulates both persistence and
flexibility, such as adjustments to “the threshold that must be exceeded by new
information to gain access to working memory” (pg. 351). A high threshold would shield
the current mental set from distracting information, supporting persistence, whereas a low
threshold would promote background monitoring of potentially relevant information,
supporting flexibility. The present findings are inconsistent with this or any other unitary
mechanism model.
Single-mechanism models of persistence-flexibility regulation parsimoniously
account for why many neurological patients exhibit both perseveration and distractibility.
However, they are harder to reconcile with reports of double dissociations between
various patient groups on measures of persistence and flexibility. For example, Stuss and
colleagues (2000) demonstrated that patients with inferior medial frontal lobe lesions
committed an inordinate number of set-loss errors but no more perseverative errors than
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non-frontal lesioned controls on the WCST. Patients with superior medial frontal lesions
exhibited the opposite pattern. In another study, Yogev, Hadar, Gutman, and Sirota
(2003) found that relative to controls, schizophrenics with mostly negative symptoms
tended to commit more perseverative errors whereas those with mostly positive
symptoms evidenced over-switching in a modified WCST paradigm.
Another corollary of demonstrating that persistence- and flexibility-related
processes operate independently is that the mechanisms that underlie them must not
involve inhibition of task-irrelevant information. With respect to persistence, sustained
activation of the current set is proposed as the mechanism for facilitation of probable
repetition trial performance. Note that this differs from distracter resistance only
(Dreisbach & Goschke, 2004) and sustained activation plus distracter resistance (Miller
& Cohen, 2001) models of persistence behavior that presume inhibitory processes. As
for flexibility, it has been previously demonstrated that backward inhibition of the nolonger-appropriate set only occurs with activation of a new set (Hubner et al., 2003; Mayr
& Keele, 2000), i.e., not with generic preparation for a switch. In the present study,
preparation for a probable switch trial could not have involved activation of a new (now
relevant) set because the particular upcoming task (and therefore the relevant set, or
stimulus-response mapping) was not known.6 It could also not involve simultaneous
partial activation of multiple (potentially-relevant) sets because this would cause
crosstalk (Ruthruff et al., 2001). Biased processing of (relatively) novel stimulus features
(e.g., Dreisbach & Goschke, 2004) or complex conjunctives of potentially-relevant
stimulus features (e.g., color and shape; Desimone & Duncan, 1995) is possible however,

6 Activation o f the new set is likely at play in task-specific switch preparation, though, and probably
explains why this type o f preparation is superior to generic switch preparation.

55

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

and may facilitate retrieval of a new mental set. In other words, flexibility may involve
biased processing of stimulus features that facilitate retrieval of new mental sets rather
than direct control of mental sets themselves. This may represent a viable explanation for
why generic switch preparation is beneficial (and why it did not appear to be in the
Dreisbach et al. (2002) study).
Consistent with this idea, a recent study using behavioral and neuroimaging
probes provided evidence that top-down input involves amplification of task-relevant
features and no accompanying inhibition of task-irrelevant information (Egner & Hirsh,
2005). In a Stroop-like paradigm with famous names and faces, participants responded
faster to incongruent trials when they were preceded by incongruent trials compared to
when they were preceded by congruent trials. They found simultaneously greater fMRI
activation of the fusiform face area of the visual cortex in the former trial type compared
to the latter, when the faces were targets (and the names were distracters). Activation of
this same region was remained at baseline when the faces were distracters, i.e., no
cortical inhibition of task-irrelevant features was observed. They concluded that “targetfeature enhancement constitutes the main selection mechanism when attention regulation
is driven endogenously as to optimize performance” (pg. 1788), and proposed the neural
mechanism for this as frontal signals that amplify the pre-stimulus baseline activity in the
cortical region involved in processing a particular stimulus feature, spatial location, or
object. However, as the authors point out, it remains to be demonstrated whether targetfeature enhancement via cortical amplification applies similarly to preparatory (topdown) processes driven by expectancies regarding the upcoming stimulus (as in the
present study) and that triggered by conflict (as in their study).
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With regard to the fourth assumption, the balance between persistence and
flexibility processes is regulated in response to changing task context, it no longer makes
sense to discuss a “balance” between them because they appear to independent rather
than antagonistic. There is, however, solid evidence that processes supporting
persistence and flexibility are dynamically regulated. In the present study, changing task
context was operationalized as probability of switch/repetition between blocks.
Participants’ expectancies regarding the upcoming trial type (repetition vs. switch) were
influenced by subjective impressions of the relative frequency of switch/repetition trials
(trial history in Experiments 1 and 2, and trial history + instructions in Experiment 3).
Conditions that promoted expectations that a forthcoming trial was likely to require a task
repetition led to facilitation of performance on repetition trials, while the opposite
conditions facilitated performance on switch trials. In other words, the “persistenceflexibility dilemma” is best conceptualized as allocating top-down resources to support
task continuation versus task shifting in order to optimize performance, given the task
demands. The cost of misallocating top-down input seems to be essentially having no
(useful) top-down input (i.e., a baseline unprepared state), rather than having to recover
from a disadvantaged, or counterproductive state, as Goschke’s original model proposed.
In summary, the present data support several assumptions of Goschke’s model but
suggest revision of others, and therefore advance our understanding of executive control.
Specifically, they confirmed that task repetition can be facilitated by top-down setmaintenance processes, but also suggested that generic (non-task specific) preparation
can facilitate task-switching, and that endogenous persistence- and flexibility-related
preparatory processes are independently (rather than antagonistically) regulated in
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response to changes in the task context. This helps to explicate the nature of top-down
contributions to attention and fits nicely with existing models of emergent executive
control. Norman and Shallice’s (1986) supervisory attention theory states that top-down
input is triggered when stimulus-driven behavior is inappropriate or insufficient.
Botnivick et al.’s (2001) conflict monitoring hypothesis explains how this top-down input
is triggered. The present revised-model takes this one step further by specifying that topdown input involves sustained activation of the current set if persistence is required or
biased processing of novel or potentially task-relevant stimulus features to facilitate
retrieval of new set if flexibility is required. These models can therefore be seen as
complementary. The neurobiologically plausible cognitive mechanisms for promoting
persistence and flexibility proposed here are not entirely novel, but rather a mere
extension of Miller and Cohen’s (2001) model of relative activation of task-relevant
processing pathways and Desimone & Duncan’s (1995) biased competition model of
selective visual attention. It should now be clear that executive control emerges from the
interaction of distributed cognitive systems, and therefore no homunculus is needed. It
should also be highlighted that this is not a global theory of prefrontal cortex function but
merely one important function that relies heavily on prefrontal regions and their posterior
cortical and subcortical connections. The prefrontal cortex is involved in cognitive
functions that go beyond controlled attention (Miller & Cummings, 2007).
Updated Literature Review
Following data collection for the present experiments, I became aware of two
highly relevant research studies. Dreisbach and Haider (in press) also manipulated the
percentage of repetition/switch trials in a block using two levels, 75/25 and 25/75. They
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informed subjects of this manipulation and encouraged them to make use of it to optimize
their performance, either at the beginning of each block (global probability condition) or
in between every trial (local probability condition). In their paradigm, subjects switched
back and forth between two tasks - deciding whether digits (1 to 9) were odd/even or
smaller/larger than five. The cue indicating which task to perform was presented
simultaneously with the target stimulus. The RCI was 1400 ms. The researchers found
that overall RT was faster in the high-repetition block condition compared to the highswitch block condition and interpreted this as reflecting higher demands of the latter.
More importantly, probable repetitions were performed faster than improbable repetitions
in both conditions. Somewhat in contrast, probable switches were performed faster than
improbable repetitions only in the local probability condition7, and to a lesser degree than
the repetition RT differences. This mirrors the disparity between repetition vs. switch
probability effects in the current study. The authors did not offer an account for this
disparity and nevertheless concluded that both probable repetition and switch trials can be
prepared for, and that their findings are consistent with Goschke’s model of dynamic
adjustment of cognitive control. Since their method involved two tasks, preparation for
switches was task-specific, whereas it was generic in our study. Thus, their finding that
probable switches were performed faster than improbable switches (at least in the local
probability condition) does not address the assumption of Goschke’s model. The present
study also added to the Dreisbach & Haider (in press) by showing that probability effects
appear even when participants are given no probability information, but rather have to

7 Although not addressed by the authors, it is surprising that they found only inconsistent evidence o f
beneficial preparation for probable switches when the identity o f the forthcoming task was known. This is
at odds with several previous studies (e.g., Dreisbach et al., 2002; Ruthruff et al., 2001; Sohn & Carlson,

2000).
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deduce it themselves. In fact, according to the manipulation check results, only about 3040% of participants were conscious of the differing probability, consistent with the
finding that people have poor subjective awareness of their preparatory processes in taskswitching (Meiren, Hommel, Bibi, & Lev, 2002). Because the present study included a
control condition (equal-proportioned block), it was also able to clarify that the
probability effects were driven by RT-benefits of preparing for a repetition/switch rather
than RT-costs of preparing not to perform a repetition/switch.
Another very recent and relevant study was conducted by Monsell and Mizon (in
press, Experiment 4). They manipulated the probability of a task switch in the same
manner as the present study, by varying the proportion of switch trials in a block (25, 50,
and 75), but between-subjects. They employed bivalent stimuli that participants
performed “shape” and “color” tasks on, with two different cues for each task. The
authors held the RCI constant at 1650 ms and the CSI was either 140 ms or 790 ms. At a
short CSI (like the present study), Monsell and Mizon found large switch costs (switch
RT - repetition RT; -200 ms) when switches were unlikely, a smaller but statistically
robust switch cost (-100 ms) when switches and repetitions were equally likely, and
negligible switch costs when switches were likely (-2 0 ms). This is highly consistent
with our finding that switch costs were large in the high-repetition block and virtually
absent in the high-switch block. Unfortunately, repetition and switch trials were not
entered as separate dependent variables in the Monsell and Mizon (in press) study, so
their results do not clarify whether the reduction in switch costs with increasing
probability of a switch trial was due to a loss of repetition benefit or gains in preparing
for a switch, or both. Granted, this was not the aim of their study.
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Limitations
Despite the (albeit somewhat mixed) prior research suggesting that practice
effects would be minimal, block order was a significant between-subjects factor in all
three experiments. In the subgroup who completed the high-switch block first showed
reliable RT differences for repetitions but not switches, whereas the subgroup who
completed the blocks in the reverse order showed reliable RT differences only for
switches. As discussed above, this pattern can be explained by a combination of practice
effects and probability effects of a similar magnitude, such that they enhance RT
differences when in agreement and nullify RT differences when in contrast. Clearly, the
results cannot be attributable solely to practice effects, otherwise there would be only null
effects in the overall data and no interaction effect at each block order. What we found
were effects for both repetitions and switches in the overall data (with the influence of
practice/fatigue effects removed; Experiment 3) and interaction effects at each block
order, although these were driven by a main effect for one variable and not the other,
suggesting at least some influence of practice. Interestingly, although not reported in
their article, the Dreisbach & Haider (in press) observed a similar pattern of block order
effects to the present study, though not in both subgroups of participants and not to the
same degree (Dreisbach, personal communication, 2006).
The differences between Experiments 1 and 3 were mainly in magnitude rather
than pattern. It seems likely that overtly instructing participants about the probability
information made a greater number of them aware of these differences8 and strengthened

8 Differential awareness alone does not seem account for the between experiment differences. When a
manipulation check variable (noticed vs. failed to notice varying repetition/switch trial frequency) was
added as a between-subjects factor to the 3 (block) x 2 (trial type) repeated-measures A N O V A in
Experiment 1, it did not modify the probability effect [F{2, 16) = .703, p = .510, r|p2 = .081], the trial type
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their confidence in/commitment to preparing for the repetition/switch trial disproportions.
The only appreciable interexperiment discrepancy was that the probability effect for
switches was minimal and non-significant in Experiment 1 (in the context of a substantial
probability effect for repetitions), whereas it was substantial in Experiment 3. The highly
similar magnitude of the repetition and switch probability effect sizes in Experiment 3
suggests that insufficient statistical power in Experiment 1 cannot explain the
discrepancy. Of note, the results of a recent study (Dreisbach & Haider, in press,
discussed above) replicated my finding that switch trial performance is less sensitive to
manipulations. They demonstrated probability effects for switches when the probability
information was provide on a trial-by-trial basis but not when it was merely provided at
the beginning of the block, whereas probability effects for repetitions were seen in both
cases. These discrepancies in both the present and Dreisbach & Haider’s (in press) study
may reflect that preparing to switch tasks is entirely an endogenous process and is
facilitated by greater environmental support. In contrast, preparing to repeat tasks is to
some extent promoted by exogenous forces (priming) but can also be enhanced by
endogenous input.
The three tasks used in this study were intended to be roughly equivalent in
difficulty. Unexpectedly, classifying objects based on a shape was more difficult than
quantity or color judgments. This may be an inherent flaw in the design of the WCST
stimuli, where the three figures are arranged in a triangular form and the four figures are
arranged in a square. This may cause added confusion because, for example, matching a
target stimulus (card from the deck) containing triangles based on shape could be
effect [ F ( l, 17) = 1.741, p - .204, r|p2 = .093], or the block by trial type interaction [F( 2, 16) = 2.886, p =
.085, T)p2 = .265; unexpectedly, the interaction was marginally stronger in the group that failed the
manipulation check],
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sensibly paired with the reference stimulus (key card) containing triangles, but also the
reference stimulus that contains different shapes but resembles a triangle at the global
perceptual level. The developmental sequence of perceptual dimensions may be an
alternative explanation (cf., Odom & Guzman, 1972). Regardless, the three tasks were
counterbalanced across blocks and trial types within blocks, and so should not have
systematically altered the main analyses.
Future Research & Applications
To evaluate the robustness of the present findings, it would be helpful to test the
effects of parameter manipulations (60:40/40:60 ratios in the high-switch and highrepetition blocks). The four main assumptions of Goschke’s model should also be re
evaluated using a different experimental paradigm, to rule out methodologic specificity.
To better understand why generic switch preparation is beneficial, future studies should
design experiments that contrast the hypotheses that biased processing is of novel versus
potentially task-relevant stimulus features. The present data cannot untangle these
possibilities.
Functional neuroimaging studies would help elucidate the neuroanatomical
underpinnings of persistence and flexibility related-processes. There is converging
evidence that traditional versions of the task-switching paradigm activate a complex
network that includes lateral prefrontal areas as well as non-frontal regions (Brass & von
Cramen, 2002; Dove, Pollmann, Schubert, Wiggins, & von Cramon, 2000; Kimberg,
Aguirre, & D ’Esposito, 2000). Interestingly, when the upcoming task is not explicitly
cued (i.e., environmental support is reduced), as in the present study, greater medial
frontal activation is seen (Forstmann, Brass, Koch, & von Cramon, 2005). This
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corresponds with neuroimaging research using conflict resolution paradigms (e.g.,
Stroop), in which medial frontal (including anterior cingulate cortex) activation is thought
to represent signaling for greater endogenous control by dorsolateral prefrontal regions
(MacDonald, Cohen, Stenger, & Carter, 2000). In the present study, the task context
changed, demanding dynamic adjustment of executive control. This version of the taskswitching paradigm can be predicted to rely on an interaction between medial and
dorsolateral frontal systems to a greater degree.
According to Goschke’s theory, the cognitive hallmark of damage to the frontal
systems is impaired context-sensitive dynamic regulation of persistence and flexibility
such that patients may inappropriately maintain set when they should be switching and at
other times (perhaps within the same test administration), be excessively distractible
when sustained focus is required. In other words, it is the maladaptation to a changing
environment rather than impaired set-maintenance or set-shifting per se. Based on this
premise, the task-switching paradigm developed in the present study may be particularly
sensitive to frontal-subcortical dysfunction. This claim could be evaluated by
administering the task-switching paradigm developed for the present study to patients
with various clinical disorders that involve the frontal systems such as traumatic brain
injury, frontotemporal dementia, schizophrenia, and Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity
Disorder.
Insofar as this holds true, the paradigm may be useful in the clinical assessment of
neurological and psychiatric patients. The factor-purity of this paradigm, relative to
traditional measures of executive control such as the WCST, might help to better
characterize the nature of cognitive impairment following frontal systems damage and
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predict real-world functioning. Because of the substantial practice effects across blocks,
adaptation would be needed. Either a long block with progressively increasing and
decreasing probabilities of switch/repetition trial, or an ABABAB blocked design might
be a solution. In the same vein of modern approaches to the assessment of executive
functioning (e.g., the Delis-Kaplan Executive Function Systems battery; Delis, Kaplan, &
Kramer, 2001), it would probably be helpful to include control task(s) in order to parse
out the non-executive functioning components of task-repetition/switching performance
(e.g., simple reaction time).
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Table 1. Trial type by response time data for equal-proportioned block in Experiment 1.
Trial type

Response type

Repetition

Switch

RT

Error Rate

Repetition

704 (128)

7.9 (4.6)

Switch

812(102)

5.1 (4.7)

Repetition

952 (235)

9.9 (8.3)

Switch

875 (138)

6.9 (6.4)
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Table 2. Task type by trial type data for equal-proportioned block in Experiment 1.
RT

Error Rate

Rep

760 (104)

3.4 (1.2)

Switch

806(124)

9.0 (2.6)

Rep

942 (146)

9.4 (2.2)

Switch

1027 (171)

7.8 (2.8)

Rep

718(118)

4.4 (2.6)

Switch

861 (159)

9.3 (2.0)

Task type

Trial type

Color

Shape

Number
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Table 3. Block by trial type data for Experiment 1.
Block

Trial type

High-switch

Equal-proportioned

High-repetition

RT

Error Rate

Rep

806 (155)

4.3 (4.9)

Switch

880(185)

8.0 (5.2)

Rep

785(104)

5.8 (4.1)

Switch

889 (158)

7.7 (6.2)

Rep

736 (99)

4.8 (2.6)

Switch

918(137)

7.1 (6.0)
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Table 4. Block by trial type data for Experiment 2.
RCI

Repetition: switch

Trial type

RT

Error Rate

Rep

818(112)

4.6 (4.1)

Switch

910(116)

9.5 (7.4)

Rep

741(93)

6.4 (3.9)

Switch

912(149)

6.3 (4.6)

Rep

913 (156)

8.5 (7.6)

Switch

1049(200)

10.1 (7.5)

Rep

839(110)

7.1 (4.5)

Switch

1030(165)

10.2 (7.1)

proportion
1000 ms

High-switch

High-repetition

100 ms

High-switch

High-repetition
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Table 5. Block by trial type data for Experiment 3.
RT

Error Rate

Rep

845 (127)

5.0 (5.0)

Switch

919(150)

8.2 (4.1)

Rep

883(179)

5.7 (3.1)

Switch

972 (236)

7.1 (4.5)

Rep

789(94)

6.4 (2.9)

Switch

985(160)

9.1 (7.6)

Block

Trial type

High-switch

Equal-proportioned

High-repetition
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Figure 1. Pictorial display of stimulus-response mappings with a sample stimulus. This
stimulus would be correctly matched to the green square (the‘C ’key) if the color task is
cued, with the two blue plus signs (V ) if the number task is cued, and with the four
yellow triangles (N 5) if the shape task is cued.
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Figure 2. Illustration of event sequence for a sample trial.
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Figure 3. Distributions of response time performance by trial number for the mixed
practice block.
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Figure 4a. Mean response times for various task recency values.
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5

Figure 4b. Mean error rates for various task recency values.
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5

Figure 5. Overall response time data for Experiment 1.
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Figure 6. Overall response time data for Exp. 3
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Appendix A
Manipulation check questions:
la. What was different about the four different parts (“blocks”) of this experiment?
lb. In the block with the least switch trials, what percentage of the trials were switch
trials?
lc. In the block with most switch trials, what percentage of the trials were switch trials?
Id. Did the difference in the percentage of switch trials change your response strategy
in each of the blocks? How so?
2. How motivated were you to try your hardest, on a scale from one to ten?
3a. How concerned were you with answering as fast as you could, on a scale from one
to ten?
3b. How concerned were you with answering correctly, on a scale from one to ten?
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